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A Nationless State? 
Malta, National Identity and the EU 
GODFREY BALDACCHINO 
This article discusses the relationship of Malta with the European 
Union in the light of Malta 's status as an example of a 'nationless 
state '. The article first develops the relevance of this under-
researched concept by locating it within the discussion of post-
colonial, small island nationalism. It then provides a historical 
critique of the emerxence of the Maltese nation less stale and of its 
various integrationist attempts with France, Italy, Britain and, most 
recentlv, the EU. Finally, the article explores the possible dialectics of 
an emerging nationalism with an entrenched two-party political 
system and its totalising discourse. 
After two years of negotiations, a comprehensive package for Malta as a 
prospective member of the European Union (EU) is taking shape. When he 
visited Malta early in 200 I, Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen advised 
the Maltese people to allow more time before they decided either in favour 
or against EU membership.' Deciding on membership is a thorny issue, 
since Malta is the EU candidate state with the strongest anti-EU sentiment, 
with the possibility of a negative result in an EU accession referendum 
likely to be held early in 2003.' What is taking shape is not just the 
emergence of a package of obligations, but perhaps the birth pangs of a long 
overdue national conscience. 
ENTER THE NATION LESS STATE 
This article will attempt to assess the unfolding relationship of Malta with 
the European Union in the light of Malta's status as an example of a 
'nationless state'. Malta's current rapprochement with the EU affords an 
intriguing opportunity for the late development of a, hitherto elusive, 
national identity. The argument is structured in three parts. The first reviews 
the theoretical underpinnings of the tensions between statehood and 
nationhood, identifying the category of the 'nationless state' and setting out 
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its relevance to the discussion by locating it within a consideration of post-
colonial nationalism in island territories. This is followed by a brief analysis 
of the emergence of the Maltese nation, the formative role of the Catholic 
Church and political parties in this evolution and the unfolding Malta-EU 
relationship over the last 30 years. The article concludes by analysing the 
consequences of the tension between Maltese nationalist (or even pseudo-
nationalist") discourse and the well-entrenched party political system. 
This approach belies the author's concern with the absence of a 
nationalist sentiment in Malta. It may be criticised for seeking to invent 
nationalism where it does not, and perhaps should not, exist:' is the 'Maltese 
nation' merely an 'imagined political community', in the literal sense?-1 The 
historical and geographical conditions of the Maltese islands appear 
conducive to the development of a unitary cultural frame of reference; and 
other small islands in a similar predicament have certainly done so.' 
However, irredentist movements in Malta have taken the upper hand in local 
politics, paradoxically utilising jurisdictional capacity - and, since political 
independence in 1964, the very apparatus of sovereignty - to facilitate the 
incorporation of Malta into a larger entity. Only the intended beneficiary of 
such an incorporation has changed in the course of 200 years of history: first 
France, then Britain or ltaly, and now the EU.'· 
STATEHOOD AND NATION 
What the nation is may be a state of mind. One cannot discount that the 
desire for, and pursuit of, self-government and authentic identity is perhaps 
the most powerful force in modem history. However, the territoriality over 
which government is exercised does not always fit snugly with the range of 
people who see themselves as rightful cohabitants and co-citizens. The 
disequilibrium between statehood and nation is today at the heart of much 
political instability, tension and civil strife. There are, first of all, 
communities that consider themselves nations, but which arc not recognised 
as such by others or are not granted the legitimacy and mechanisms of fully-
fledged states. These arc 'nations in waiting', 'proto-nations', 'nations 
without states' or 'non-state nations'.7 These include 'Kurds, Basques, 
Armenians, Palestinians, Quebe<;ois, Cree Indians, Scots, Welsh, Cornish 
... many others'.' What binds them together is that each somehow 
demonstrates a 'national conscience'. These assemblages are being given 
increasing recognition in the devolutionist strategies of governments 
threatened hy actual or potential secession (Euskadi-Spain; 
Corsica-France; Padania~·ltaly; Quebec & Nunavut-Canada; or 
Cechnya-Russia), as well as by the strengthened regional policy of the EU 
in the' Europe of the Regions' :1 
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There are, on the other hand, 'cleft states' embodying an uncomfortable, at 
times tempestuous, collection of two or more distinguishable, often ethnic, 
groups.10 Here, loyalty to the clan/nation usually assumes priority over that 
to a typically weak state and its imperfect structures, imposed as the latter 
may have been through rigged elections, war, conquest or colonisation, Sri 
Lanka, Nigeria, Rwanda and Fiji comprise a diverse set of such 'cleft 
states', with Madagascar (for some time this year) an emerging candidate, 
What is proposed here is a distinct, third category of such disjuncture, 
which does not deal with the relationship and overlap of statehood and 
nationhood, hut with the existence of statehood without a defined sense of 
nationhood, There is no interplay here between different ethnic groups 
within the same state, or between states; no 'minority-majority' 
relationship; no conflict hetween a dominating and a dominated ethnic 
group, This is the specitic plight of 'states without nations'," Evidence of 
such 'nationlessness' in sovereign states is difficult to discern, all the more 
so since states are somehow expected, and expect themselves to be nations. 
The political and ideological apparatus of any such state will certainly 
endeavour to promote the notion that the nation does exist - even though 
that may be an exercise in the construction of a fallacy, Still, history is 
replete with cxamples of notional states created by default Or design, 
Territories harbouring no territorial or identity connicts between 
indigenous peoples or ethnic groups may include small island states, 
Various islands have found themselves far away from metropolitan centres 
that did not administer, but acculturalised the inhabitants of their island 
colonies. Such insular territories were often eventually obliged to accept 
distinct sovereignty almost by default, even in view of the absence of a 
larger, and practicaL political settlement. I ' This category comprises various 
small island jurisdictions, which have not been colonised but created by 
colonialism. We are not talking of societies where the natives have been 
supplanted hy immigrant settlers, but rather where the natives are the 
settlers. I.! These conform to Naipaul's strikingly vicious labels of 
'manufactured societies, labour camps, creations of empire' .1.\ They may 
indeed be states, and take pains to proclaim themselves as such, with all the 
panoply and ceremony usually associated with statehood. However, even 
after long years of political independence, they may still be searching for a 
sense of authentic nationhood_ Referring to Naipaul again, they may have 
been fated, or fortunate, in always having meant to form part of something 
larger," typically a colonial master turned patron, Historically, they may 
have much in common with small territories that stubbornly refuse to 
entertain independence. 
Indeed, a tangible demonstration of the relative absence of a national 
conscience would be the inditference, if not outright hostility, to political 
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sovereignty. Examples include the Seychelies; '" Anguilla;" a variety of 
scattered small island dependencies of Britain'" and the Netherlands;'" or the 
integration and absorption into a larger nation in the case of the 
departements d'outre mer of Francc.20 One may also mention the enosis of 
the two Cypriot communities with either Greece or Turkey. Such examples 
go against the conventional wisdom, which equates insularity with 
community and assumes the existence of an island-based and island-driven 
national identity that finds its obvious and legitimate contemporary 
expression through political sovereignty. A typical claim would be that the 
geographical isolation and compact socio-political universe of small island 
states are 'likely to promote feelings of fellowship and a sense of 
community' .21 Other commentators are more critical and qualify island 
identity in accordance to current geo~political forces and perceptions. Thus, 
according to Jean Didier Hache, the reference to one's predicament as an 
insular onc in the case of citizens of island territories invariably refers to the 
deliberate placing of that island in a potentially subordinate or peripheral 
power relationship, with a major player, 'centre' or 'mainland' beyond: 
insularity tends to be the result of a process of economic, social, 
cultural and political peripheralisation that has affected these 
populations, a process made more acute, or more apparent, by their 
insular condition; ... insularity should be seen, first and foremost, as 
a political phenomenon, and especially as the product of evolving 
centre/periphery relationships." 
Thus, an island people's identity as such, and the emergence of an island 
nation-state, need not be automatic, but should be seen as the outcome of a 
formative cultural process that involves a struggle, even if only 
psychological or virtual, with an external 'other'. In the absence of any such 
referent, a sovereign island state may have little inducement towards 
developing a territoriaily based nationalism. 
MALTA: A NATlONLESS STATE? 
Primordial and secondary elements of identity include ethnicity, language, 
religion, cultural values and customs, a distinct historical self-view and a 
sense of territorial bonding. L' Malta would certainly appear to qualify on ail 
these counts to the untested eye. With a long history of colonisation of at 
least five millennia, the Maltese come across today as a people with no 
internal racial tensions, united by the Catholic faith, speaking a unique 
language and living on definitively precise limestone blocks comprising just 
316 square kilometres. Yet onc may hazard to proclaim that Malta today is 
a 'nation less state', a 37-year-old sovereign unit where the nation is yet to 
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be formed. It is easy to condone references to a monolithic 'Maltese 
Society'." Such a definitive term fails to render justice to sub-cultural trait, 
amongst the Maltese" and rails to take account of the existence of - albeit 
very small - minority groups, such as Indian entrepreneurs or retired British 
pensioners," But history, acute population density and the pervasive 
socialising powers of Catholicism have tended to erode many cultural 
differences over time. It would, therefore, be fair to define Malta as a 'cross-
roads island' with a 'cosmopolitan and polyglot' population reflecting the 
'ethnic and linguistics mixtures of Phoenician, Arab, Sicilian and British 
colonial influences' :'7 Other than in extreme cases, ethnicity is not a relevant 
analytical category to contemporary Malta. 
The Maltese Islands certainly qualify as pioneers in imaginative 
statecraft, having been held as a distinct fiefdom by Aragonese and 
Castellan landlords in the late Middle Ages and subsequently having spent 
a long period (1530-1798) as the seat of the Knights of St John of 
Jerusalem, a theocracy that ruled over Malta in an interesting chivalric and 
pioneering version of the European Union. Specific nation-building 
initiatives as such were not, however, encouraged by the ruling etite, 
including the Maltese aristocracy of lawyers, medics and priests, a 
comprador bourgeoisie even in a cultural sense that traditionally and 
linguistically associated itself readily with Italy. Indeed, the eventual unity 
of Malta with Italy was a policy pursued in the early to mid-1900s by 
various exponents of the strong Nationalist (sic) Party (NP)," and several 
NP leaders, many with declared fascist sympathies, were interned in 
Uganda for the duration of the Second World War, when Malta served as the 
critical fulcrum of the British war effort in the Mediterranean theatre. The 
legitimation of Maltese as an official language by the 1930, was a largely 
unintended outcome of the struggle for cultural (and political) supremacy 
between Italian and English, the latter being the upcoming language of the 
new middle mercantile and administrative classes during the period of 
British rule (1800-1964),'" There was absolutely no struggle for political 
independence - granted by Britain on 21 September 1964 - and its pursuit 
was again a 'second best' option after attempts to secure full integration by 
the Malta Labour Party (MLP) with Britain had failed in the late 1950s. 
Premier Mintoff did negotiate successfully to extend the date of the eventual 
dismantling of the British Military Base in Malta, the mainstay of the local 
'fortress' economy, up to March 1979, 
This is not to argue that Malta has had no nationalist birth pangs.'" An 
undercurrent of anti-colonial resistance had been active in Malta certainly 
since the late Middle Ages." Even before Malta was officially declared a 
British colony by the Treaty of Amiens in 1814, there were already 
agitations for representative rights and institutions by members of the 
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Maltese c1erico-professional elite. The spontaneous 'bread riots' of June 
1919 did bring about a reassessment of the assumed loyalty of the Maltese 
and paved the way to the first self-governing constitution in 1921. Still, the 
one 'national' rebellion to speak of in two centuries occurred during the 
hrief French occupation (1798-1800). Then, the Maltese rose against their 
new occupiers when the French started despoiling the local Catholic 
churches of their gold and silver artifacts. Interestingly, it was in favour of 
the interests of the local Catholic Church that the Maltese rebelled; and 
clerics played a key role in organising the uprising. 
The power of the Catholic Church in Malta must not he underestimated, 
even today. The Catholic Church and its ethos and ceremonies remain today 
the closest to a national Maltese symbol. In spite of evident secularisation, 
around 70 per cent of the population attend weekly mass regularly; a third 
of all young Maltese complete their schooling in church schools; and most 
young Maltese have to attend long hours of 'doctrine' to qualify for the 
sacrament of confirmation. There is one church or chapel for every square 
kilometre on the small archipelago, and many remain in use. Most of the 
arts - including music, drama, sculpture, painting, folk stories - are 
patronised substantially by the church and have explicit religious themes. 70 
per cent of the Maltese identify commitment to religious values as their top 
priority in life." The decisions of the Catholic Church's ecclesiastical 
tribunal in declaring the annulment of marriages or otherwise are recognised 
in the civil courts. Malta remains the only European country that has not 
legalised divorce. Malta's long years as a Catholic fiefdom facilitated the 
emergence of a local ecclesiastical hierarchy that exercised strong political 
and cultural inf1uence. This, in turn, has bred a national mind-frame 
strongly determined by religious precepts of propriety and morality. Thus, 
non-Christians have been historically relegated to the status of 'heathens' or 
'infidels', and in this way have served as a convenient 'other' to the 
Maltese. The contrast aggrandises the role of the Catholic faith and church 
in moulding Maltese national identity, albeit in non-secular fashion. 
The hegemony of the Catholic Church in Malta was dented most 
seriously in its drawn out confrontation with the Malla Labour Party during 
the I 960s. The Church then did not support the MLP's campaign for Malta's 
integration with Britain, for fear that its interests would not be safeguarded 
and would eventually he eroded in an Anglican British state. The Church 
may also have had serious concerns that Dom Mintoff, the charismatic MLP 
leader, had Communist tendencies which - given his well-publicised 
overtures to China, North Korea and the Soviet Union - might eventually 
translate Malta into a secular state where the Catholic Church would lose 
out. In a bitter showdown hetween Church and political party in 1961, the 
top MLP officials were excommunicated from the Church; the faithful were 
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advised that voting for the MLP would be tantamount to a mortal sin; while 
MLP activists were denied the holy sacraments and were buried in non-
consecrated ground, Religious services of reparation were held at those 
public spaces that had hosted MLP meetings; this included the sprinkling of 
holy water. The crisis served to harden the resolve and commitment of the 
core MLP supporters and peace was only made in 1969, two years before 
the MLP was returned to power. Such high drama is still within living 
memory of the Maltese popUlation, including the bulk of the current 
political and religious leadership, 
Malta's proportional representation system with only two political 
parties represented in parliament is unique in Europe, With the allegiance of 
the voting population - just 281,000 at the latest (September 1998) election 
- split neatly down the middle, the difference in voter support between the 
two main political parties has never been more than 13,000 votes since 
197 L In such a situation, a 'winner takes all' political system prevails, A 
candidate requires close to 3,300 votes to get elected to the 65-seat national 
parliament, a small number that institutionalises close personal and 
patronage links between politicians and their constituents, The MLP and NP 
are today 'catch-all' parties, which deploy both conventional and modern 
techniques for both the mass and customised socialisation of citizens into 
loyal and unswerving party faithfuL Each political party now has its own 
television station, radio station and newspapers; its own emblems, flags and 
anthems; not to mention the web of party clubs and committees spread all 
over the country. Information on the voting preferences of each and every 
Maltese is a key and active concern of the political parties, In the dense, 
claustrophobic social atmosphere - there are almost 2,000 persons per 
square kilometre - the presence, if not control, of the party is supreme and 
complete: 
Partisanship in this polarized polity is so pervasive, ingrained and 
linked to class ideology and locality that preference patterns are 
known by streeL Loyalties are strong, stable and rooted in social and 
family background,,, [Cjandidates can employ networks of family 
and friends Lo promote their election chances and to achieve greater 
social control over their sympathizers. They may also be able to 
reward their known supporters if elected. B 
With the overriding influence of the Church - now keen not to involve itself 
in partisan politics - the Maltese are, from cradle to grave, called upon to 
express loyalty and commitment to any of these three 'total institutions'," The 
political party thus takes on the characteristics of an ethnie, a moral 
community, extending the locus of empathy, trust and identification with 
others as if in an extended family, " Loyalty to the state and to the ethnie may 
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easily be perceived as being on a potential collision course.ll> The strong sense 
of partisan identification and the (real or imaginary?) pursuit of partisan-
driven clientism may easily override any sense of national patriotism to the 
larger civic and territorial whole. While the casual observer may dismiss the 
relevance of ethnicity from Malta's socio-political landscape, a local form of 
bicommunalisrn based on political ethnicity is current;-n an implosion of the 
democratic Maltese state as a result of partisan ethnic fragmentation appeared 
possible in the constitutional crisis of 1981-84.'" 
In this incessant, internal struggle for loyalty and support, Maltese 
nationalism has lost out. The notion of the nation as an 'imagined 
community' becomes relevanl.w National symbols remain significant in 
their absence and, where identified, are quickly taken over and co-opted by 
partisan andlor religious motifs. A brace of poets and writers have struggled 
for some years to raise the spirit of nationalism, but their message has fallen 
on deaf ears and reads strangely hollow.·' Some academics have sought to 
emphatically announce the cultural maturation of Maltese nationalism, 
much like a natural development, particularly with the onset of political 
independence: 'Malteseness came of age ... The new state was, after all, an 
old nation.'41 But is this not more properly appraised as an exercise in wish-
fulfilment? Is this not part of the unconscious obligation to defend and 
justify nationalism, especially de rigueur in newly independent states? 
The alternative explanation propounded in this paper is that the battle for 
the definition of Maltese national identity has yet to commence. Malta may 
be an 'old nation' in a cultural sense, but politically this nation does not 
disclose or manifest itself, whether to the inside or to the outside world. This 
critical assessment can be taken forward at different analyticallevels.4: First, 
in specific situations, an easily manageable tourist front i~ resorted to by the 
Maltese in relation to foreigners; in this case, the language of 
communication is typically English. Amongst themselves, however, the 
Maltese develop an intricate knowledge of the partisan affiliations and 
loyalties of friends, family and acquaintances, effectively mapping a 
network of potential influence, patronage and obligation. 4-1 In these 
instances, the interaction is strictly aural-oral, and the code is the Maltese 
language, conveniently incomprehensible to all but the locals. Second, in 
relation to the labour markct and social stratification, the industrial working 
classes are traditionally loyal to the Labour Party, while farmers, 
entrepreneurs and civil servants gravitate mainly towards the Nationalist 
Party. In spite of a congruence of policy by the two political parties over 
recent decades, this occupationaUsocial class split remains surprisingly 
strong. Third, macro-power structures are strongly aligned with political 
organisations. The latter have become wel1-organised networks at national, 
regional and local levels, down to specific streets and neighbourhoods. With 
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one of the two political organisations in full control of the state apparatus at 
auy time, the likelihood of obtaining desirable 'goods' from the state is 
generally seen to change in accordance with the nature aud clout of 
individual partisan affiliation. Fourth, the cultural identity of the individual 
Maltese, aud the perception of one's life world, remains substantially 
dominated by such partisan definitions. The Catholic Church, via the parish 
priest, provides the only escape route here, and only at a local level. Finally, 
the assessment of the past and the present continues to be dominated by 
contradictory interpretations of the relevance of historical events. As 
reported by an expatriate living in Malta: the Maltese are very proud of their 
[past] history, but apparently not of their present.~ 
The analyses converge: only the members of the troika - the two main 
political parties and the Catholic Church - loom large as anchors of identity, 
The 'national interest' has been sabotaged: imploded into frenzied 
partisanship internally; replaced by integrationism externally. 
SEARCHING FOR 'NATIONNESS' 
Following a major survey of the economic and democratic track record of 
different states, Srebrnik has argued that a society's sense of identity and 
self-worth, coupled by cultural values that promote trust, innovation, 
education and hard work, are the most important factors determining 
winners in a global economy.4.~ The statement has the features of a truism; 
but the spatial separateness and 'geographical precision' of small islands 
certainly appear a priori to bestow them with the potential for a stronger 
sense of self. pride and identity." Empirical research also suggests that 
small. mainly island, states are likely to have a strong democratic tradition.~7 
What Srebrnik fails to identify in his otherwise excellent essay is that 
identity is also relational; a strong sense of the self can depend on a strong 
sense of ·othemess·. With a benign colonial administration keen to maintain 
Malta primarily for strategic reasons rather than exploitative economic 
ones, the obvious 'other'- the colonial master - was hardly an enemy, 
unlike in many other colonial settings. Armed insurrections for 
independence, those potentially excellent schools for the formation of 
nationalism, were, therefore, never contemplated in Malta. If anything, it 
was the exact antithesis - irredentism or integration - that was seriously 
considered. The ties with something larger - intimated by Naipaul - have 
been and remain strong. ~~ In language, tourism, legislation, education and 
culture, Britain remains magnetic to the Maltese. Such a paternalist 
relationship - descrihed in such strong terms as 'upside down 
decolonisation'4') - is shared with many of the citizens of Britain's non-
sovereign overseas island territories. 51) 
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This is the context to Malta's application to join the EU, which, as may 
be expected from such a cultural context, remains gripped by debates 
maintaining strict partisan political lines. Malta's formal relationship with 
the EU goes back to April 197 I, when an association agreement between 
Malta and the EU entered into force. Malta was the third country to enter 
into such an agreement with the then EU-6 and indicated an initial readiness 
of the island to seek favourable terms of engagement in the European 
economic space. The association agreement was originally meant to 
proceed to a customs union. However, this step was never taken, since 
subsequent Maltese Labour governments preferred setting up a protectionist 
regime that promoted indigenous industry, particularly in small-scale 
manufacturing, agriculture and artisanal fisheries. The policy change came 
with the election of the Nationalist government in 1987 on a liberalising 
platform. The formal application to join the EU was lodged in July 1990. [n 
June 1993, the European Commission expressed a favourable opinion on 
Malta's candidature. In 1995, Malta, along with Cyprus, was informed that 
the formal pre-accession dialogue would start within six months of the 
conclusion of the next inter-governmental conference. This was duly 
concluded at Maastricht in 1997; but, by then, the Malta Labour Party had 
been elected to power and Malta's application for EU membership had been 
'frozen' by the MLP. A special agreement was to be explored between 
Malta and the EU, a 'Switzerland in the Mediterranean' option that would 
defend Malta from the threats to its economy and sovereignty, which, it was 
argued by the MLP, would inevitably follow from full EU accession. The 
MLP lost power after 22 months in office; the re-elected NP reactivated 
Malta's application, and the country joined the 'Helsinki six' that were 
cleared to commence accession negotiations in December 1998. Malta 
started its screening of the acquis communautaire in spring 1999 and 
formally launched its accession negotiations in February 2000. The NP -
currently in power ~ remains enthusiastically in favour of EU membership 
at the earliest opportunity, and is negotiating those special conditions 
deemed crucial in recognition of Malta's specific circumstances. The MLP 
continues to argue against EU membership which, it claims, is not in 
Malta's best interests, since it would effectively cheat the Maltese of 
sovereignty and transform Malta into the EU's work or holiday destination. 
This could thwart locals' employment opportunities or affordable housing 
in their own country. There is no evident, intra-party debate: party discipline 
is draconian. The Church, nudged regularly to take a stand, remains 
defiantly, and predictably, aloof. 
Against this background one may argue that it is precisely in relation to 
the EU that the historically elusive, external 'other' - a precondition for a 
nascent Maltese nationalism - may have suddenly appeared. The EU 
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membership debate is replete with references to national artifacts or 
symbols: sovereignty, neutrality, national language, national institutions, 
culture, representation in European institutions, status of foreign workers, 
access by foreigners to local real estate, control over local fishing grounds, 
the replacement of the local currency (the Maltese Lira) by the Euro, the 
adoption of various EU common trade and security policies, promotion and 
protection of local agricultural products, even traditional cuisine. Possibly, 
a novel Maltese nationalism is being generated by and through such 
debates. 
RECONSTRUCTING IDENTITY? 
The EU-Malta issue may appear to be a classic case of an unfolding 
'core-periphery' relationship. As indicated by Hache," changing historical, 
political or economic circumstances can do much to trigger an identity 
transformation. which can then manifest itself in a change of populist 
discourse. 
The local debate about the pros and cons of EU membership is certainly 
intense, occupying much airtime on radio and television as well as columns 
of newsprint. But it is not exactly a 'debate': politicians, in strict discipline, 
toe the party line. Experts and academics, rather than being seen as 
independent and critical 'third parties', are often associated readily with a 
political stripe. Notionally, the opportunity of EU membership is a step 
towards a different, supra-national basis of identity, a neo-tribal 
'Europeanness', which is itself the object of intensive identity-making." 
The prospect of eventual EU membership may be obliging some Maltese to 
think, at long last. of themselves in relation to an external other: something 
they have very rarely been obliged to do in their history, and certainly never 
in circumstances where they were alone facing 'the other' in deciding on the 
parameters of a complex and evolving relationship. Looking at other 
countries is not of much help to the Maltese here. There may be another 12 
EU candidate countries, but the predicament of Malta is unique and not 
comparable to any of the other states. 
The importance of the decision is gradually dawning; and nationalist 
issues appear to be coming to the fore in the debate. The concerns are 
clearly neither partisan political nor religiously defined: they cut across 
party and ideological lines and reflect the balance between isolation and 
integration that any sovereign state must fashion in the contemporary world. 
Could this identity crisis facilitate a nascent Maltese nationalism? Such a 
phenomenon would certainly threaten the existing, proto-ethnic duopoly 
that has seen regular alterations of power between the two political parties 
for 30 years. As if to nip this threat deftly in the bud, the MLP has declared 
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that it will not accept the results of any NP government-run plebiscite on EU 
membership. Instead, the MLP would only accept the results of the next 
generd! election - scheduled no later than the beginning of 2004 - as the 
popular vote deciding in favour or against eventual EU membership for 
Malta. Should the NP comply, then one wonders to what extent a rigidly 
partisan vote would dictate Malta's European destiny, rather than the other 
way round. 
The crisis of looming Europeanness amongst the Maltese may hinder a 
smooth transition to the acceptance of a paternal, benign, external other. The 
'EU question' may bring about a cultural condition that has surfaced at 
various times in Malta's recent history: the willing incorporation into the 
cultural, if not economic and political, ambit of a larger state. The latter 
years of the reign of the Order of St John in Malta were a period of subtle 
but deep Gallicisation, broken only when the position and wealth of the 
Catholic Church in Malta came under threat from the occupying French." 
Subsequently, it was irredentism with either Britain or Italy that explained 
most of the local political tussles of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Had the Nationalist Party's plans for Malta to join Italy in the 
1930s, or the Labour Party's plans for Malta to join Britain in the 1950s 
materialised, then, as a matter of course, Malta could have been part of the 
European Union since either 1958 or 1973. But what evidence of 
nationalism is it when the alleged nation seeks to thwart - rather than 
struggle for - its own political sovereignty? Can one conceive now of a 
novel brand of nationalism, one that is comfortable even as it seeks to 
diminish. rather than enhance, the autonomy and discretion of its statist and 
political dimension') Malta's unitary, national identity appears to be 
ultimately anti-nationalist externally and proto-ethnic internally. In such 
circumstances, appeals to sovereignty can come across as manufactured 
rearguard actions to brake, or replace, the movement towards regional 
supra-nationalism, as well as to cement the status quo of partisan gridlock. 
In 197 J, the showdown of Prime Minister Dam Mintoff with James 
Callaghan, his British counterpart, was a historical conjuncture that kindled 
feelings of 'one-nation' among the Maltese. Mintoff's 'maverick' foreign 
policy has had many detractors; but it certainly attempted to bestow some 
pride on the Maltese as more than the happy natives of a small and marginal 
state. His industrial development policy also sought a sense of 'economic 
self-reliance' without a fortress economy. This included an ambitious 
programme of nationalisation of banks, airline, energy and 
telecommunications enterprises. The adoption of a Republican Constitution 
in 1974 and the complete dismantling of Malta's 'fortress economy' role by 
1979 were nothing less than remarkable feats. Malta as 'one nation', 
however, was not to be. After 1977, the MLP policy met massive opposition 
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from a variety of local interests; and the democratic crisis of the early 1980s 
forcefully re-established the 'either~or' and 'us~them' partisan paradigm. 
Gellner and Grillo have both argued that nationalist ideology emerges as 
a reaction to industrialisation and the uprooting of people from their local 
communities." In the Maltese island state of a paltry 316 square kilometres, 
which has also leapfrogged the industrialisation stage in its transition from 
agriculture to services, this dramatic upheaval has not happened and is 
inconceivable. This suggests that Malta may have an affinity with other 
small, compact, island states in the contemporary status of an elusive 
nationalism.55 The historic referendum on EU accession appears to be 
heading towards yet another partisan-contoured and partisan-driven contest: 
'IT]here is no sign of political consensus on issues and little sense of a 
concept such as the "national interest". ''ih In such an eventuality, the Maltese 
are likely to confirm their standing as 'ambivalent Europeans'." The 
challenges of eventual EU membership would, thus, remain subsumed 
under a duopoly, certainly as far as the decision to join or not to join is 
concerned. Malta looks set to lumber on into the foreseeable future with the 
momentum of statist 'extantism'-~H and the credentials of a non-nationalist, 
albeit sovereign, state ~ including the glaring and telling absence of a single 
national day. ';'I 
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